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Abstract
What is a “rational” decision? Economists traditionally viewed rationality as maximizing expected
satisfaction. This view has been useful in modeling basic microeconomic concepts, but falls short
in accounting for many everyday human decisions. It leaves unanswered why some things reliably
make people more satisfied than others, and why people frequently act to make others happy at a
cost to themselves. Drawing on an evolutionary perspective, we propose that people make
decisions according to a set of principles that may not appear to make sense at the superficial
level, but that demonstrate rationality at a deeper evolutionary level. By this, we mean that people
use adaptive domain-specific decision-rules that, on average, would have resulted in fitness
benefits. Using this framework, we re-examine several economic principles. We suggest that
traditional psychological functions governing risk aversion, discounting of future benefits, and
budget allocations to multiple goods, for example, vary in predictable ways as a function of the
underlying motive of the decision-maker and individual differences linked to evolved life-history
strategies. A deep rationality framework not only helps explain why people make the decisions
they do, but also inspires multiple directions for future research.
Consider the array of decisions facing a 30-year old MBA graduate just beginning her first
full-time management position. In her first days on the job, she will be asked to choose
between several investment packages for retirement, with different mixtures of risky versus
safe investments. Not long thereafter, she will need to make equally complex decisions
about how to invest her scarce time and effort at work (e.g., choosing between various
projects, forming alliances with coworkers, impressing superiors, managing subordinates),
and in her personal life (e.g., finding a romantic partner, spending time with friends and
family, starting her own family) as well as making decisions about how to make trade-offs
between work and personal life. Such decisions are fundamentally microeconomic, in that
they involve an individual's allocation of limited resources. Traditionally, microeconomic
decisions have been modeled on broad notions of rational choice whereby entities attempt to
maximize their utility, or expected satisfaction (e.g. Bronfenbrenner, Sichel, & Gardner,
1990; Mas-Collel, Whinston, & Green, 1995).
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In what follows, we suggest an expanded, evolutionarily-informed view of rationality that
utilizes classic economic tools and also takes into account recent theory and findings at the
intersection of evolutionary biology and cognitive science. Evolutionary approaches are
inherently economic in nature, focusing on individuals' allocation of scarce resources to
various fitness-relevant activities. A key assumption of the evolutionary perspective is that
the human brain contains not one monolithic “rational decision-making device,” but rather a
number of different decision-systems, each operating according to different rules. Which
system is currently doing the decision-making depends on adaptively relevant features of the
current environment, as well as on the decision-maker's sex, mating strategy, and phase in
the life-cycle, among other factors.
We re-examine several general principles of economic psychology in light of this view of
rationality. We suggest that traditional psychological functions governing risk aversion,
discounting of future benefits, and budget allocations to multiple goods, for example, vary in
predictable ways as a function of which fitness-relevant domain is being prioritized.
Specifically, we explore how such economic choices might differ depending on whether the
decision-maker is currently considering issues of status, mate acquisition, mate retention,
friendship, self-protection, or kin-care. We further suggest that the effects of these
motivational influences will vary depending on specific individual differences, such as the
sex and age of the decision-maker. In sum, we suggest that a consideration of recent
developments in evolutionary psychology can fruitfully expand our understanding of the
economic psychological study of everyday decisions.
Economic Rationality
Theories of rationality have provided a powerful framework for the modeling of
microeconomic decisions (e.g., Kreps, 1990). From this perspective, preferences and
resource allocation decisions are characterized as utility maximizing functions. “Utility”
translates loosely into expected satisfaction (Bronfenbrenner et al., 1990). Utility-based
theories of rational decision-making have a number of conceptually useful features. For
example, such models make it possible to translate conceptually vague preferences into
quantifiable units. Qualitatively different preferences can be equated by converting them
into a common currency of utility units, often called “utils,” making it possible to compare
the value of apples, oranges, computers, cars, or any other commodity. More generally, such
models provide a parsimonious mathematical basis for representing people's preferences and
resource allocation decisions.
Over the years, microeconomic theories of utility optimization have been revised to take into
account some of the constraints facing human minds, including costs of obtaining
information and limits in computational ability (e.g., Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). Some
researchers have suggested that, given those various constraints, decisions resulting from
optimization may not be as effective as those achieved by computationally simpler heuristics
(e.g., Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Group, 2002; Simon, 1957).
Whereas some economic theorists have assumed that each person's preferences are
idiosyncratic, others have argued that such variations arise because people incorporate
considerations of other people's welfare into their preferences (e.g., people with children
might get greater satisfaction from benefits accruing to their children rather than to
themselves; e.g., Becker, 1981). For example, one person may be willing to spend a great
deal for tickets to the opera and dinner dates in expensive restaurants, whereas another may
prefer to spend the same large sum on a home security system to protect his or her children.
Economic theorists have not generally been concerned with the origins of such other-
concerns (Bergstrom, 1996). More generally, although economic theorists have considered
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various constraints and advanced various refinements on the traditional model, most have
remained relatively agnostic about the roots of utility.
Granted, the purpose of microeconomic models has been to mathematically represent basic
elements that underlie aggregate preferences and choices. In this regard, the models have
been extremely useful. Furthermore, psychologists studying complex decision-making have
noted the benefits of such quantitative models (e.g., Erev & Cohen, 1990; Kenrick &
Sundie, 2007; Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 1991). Nevertheless, a consideration of the
functional origins of preferences could expand the explanatory power of such models.
To leverage the modern developments at the interface of evolutionary biology and cognitive
science as well as the benefits of basic quantitative models, we propose adopting an
expanded view of economic rationality that incorporates theoretically-grounded variations in
preferences across individuals and contexts. Such a view can clarify the nature of individual
differences in preferences and lead to a greater understanding of the domain-specific
objectives, contextual inputs, and decision rules that underlie people's actual preferences and
choices. Importantly, the approach we will outline has extensive implications, suggesting
new hypotheses about previously unexplored regions of human decision-making.
Evolutionary Economics: Utility = Fitness
Why do some things have utility for most people, and others not? Although people differ
from one another in their patterns of preferences, most place high value on certain social
commodities, such as spending time with good friends, eating good food, getting praise from
their bosses, being kissed by an attractive romantic partner, or being hugged by their
children. Understanding the roots of utility could allow a richer understanding of many key
resource-allocation choices people make. Some economists have turned to recent
developments in evolutionary biology, and advanced the simple assumption that utility =
fitness (e.g., Gandolfi, Gandolfi, & Barash, 2002). In biological terms, “fitness” refers
roughly to an organism's capacity to get its genes into the next generation, either by
producing its own offspring or by helping relatives reproduce. Evolutionary biologists
assume that the mechanisms driving all organisms' choices are ultimately designed to
maximize fitness. This suggestion implies that choices are not arbitrary, but are sensibly
connected to important biological goals.
Our approach to decision-making follows up on the general idea that fitness = utility.
However, we believe that appealing generally to “fitness” is not itself specific enough (c.f.,
Aktipis & Kurzban, 2004). What serves a person's fitness varies depending on several
biologically relevant factors, including the person's stage of life history, current ecological
factors (linked to psychology via currently activated motives), and individual differences in
mating strategy (itself an interactive function of innate and past ecological factors). In
particular, two key sets of concepts from modern evolutionary theory suggest systematic
variations in human preferences. One is the concept of functional modularity or domain-
specificity: Modern evolutionary theorists, following on findings from cognitive science,
presume that the human brain does not operate as one large central processing unit but
instead solves different adaptive problems using relatively independent functional modules
(e.g., Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Kenrick, Sadalla, & Keefe, 1998). In other words, the notion
of modularity presumes that there are domain-specific decision-rules, which are themselves
activated by distinct inputs and which produce specialized outputs for different problems of
social living (e.g., Kenrick, Li, & Butner, 2003; Schaller, Park, & Kenrick, 2007). Such
domain-specific modules favor fitness-enhancing choices, yet may produce morphologically
very different behaviors in different contexts. People do not make decisions using the same
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criteria in interactions with their children, their mates, their friends, and their superiors
(Ackerman, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2007; Fiske, 1992; Kenrick, Sundie, & Kurzban, 2008).
Another key set of evolutionary concepts comes from life-history theory, developed by
behavioral ecologists to understand the critically different trade-offs organisms face at
different life stages. For example, early growth, mating, parenting, and grandparenting
involve acquiring and spending different resources according to different sets of natural
priorities (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005; Kenrick & Luce, 2006). We discuss both sets of key
ideas in more detail below.
Domain Specificity and Deep Rationality
The assumption that people are motivated by a general desire to maximize utility, or the
related idea that organisms are motivated to “seek reward” and “avoid punishment,” are two
examples of “domain general” approaches to understanding behavior. Such views initially
appeal to parsimony, but an abundance of research on learning and cognition has posed
problems for these “one mind – one process” approaches (Sherry & Schacter, 1987; Tooby
& Cosmides, 1992). Instead, people and other organisms seek different kinds of pleasure
and avoid different kinds of punishment using very different, and sometimes completely
incompatible, rules.
Zoologists and comparative psychologists have uncovered a wealth of specialized
behavioral and cognitive mechanisms peculiarly suited to the demands of particular species
(Alcock, 2005). Consider mechanisms for learning avoidance to poisonous foods, which do
not follow the same rules as other learning mechanisms (Rozin & Kalat, 1971). Whereas
some learning requires instantaneous feedback (e.g., it is important that we feel pain
immediately after touching a hot stove to learn not to touch it), people and other animals can
learn to avoid foods that made them sick many hours after the food was eaten. Learning
aversion to foods is also unlike many other types of learning, in that it requires only one trial
and is difficult to extinguish. Furthermore, the types of stimuli that get conditioned to nausea
vary in ways consistent with an organism's evolutionary history and typical ecology. For
example, rats, which have poor vision and rely on taste and smell to find food at night,
easily condition aversions to novel tastes, but not to novel visual stimuli (Garcia & Koelling,
1966). Quail, on the other hand, which have excellent vision and rely on visual cues in food
choice, show the opposite bias, conditioning easily to visual cues but not to taste (Wilcoxon,
Dragoin, & Kral, 1972).
Much research demonstrates that humans have different domain-specific systems for dealing
with different types of adaptive problems, including learning aversions to different types of
objects, language learning, long-term memory for different types of objects, facial
recognition, spatial location, object perception, and fear conditioning (e.g., Barrett &
Kurzban, 2006; Domjan, 2005; Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002; Sherry &
Schacter, 1987). For example, people show adaptive biases in visual detection for different
types of objects. People are much faster and more accurate at detecting objects that posed
threats in ancestral environments (e.g., predatory animals) than at detecting objects that pose
threats only in modern-day environments (e.g., fast-moving vehicles) (New, Cosmides, &
Tooby, 2007). Better detection for predatory animals than for other objects—even dangerous
objects that we are taught to be wary of from early age—suggests a domain-specific
monitoring system tuned to ancestral rather than to modern priorities. Similarly, people
show domain-specific biases in fear conditioning. Fear is much more easily conditioned to
objects that resemble snakes or spiders— objects that posed a significant threat throughout
our evolutionary past—than to electrical outlets or automobiles—objects that cause many
more deaths in current-day environments, but which did not exist in our evolutionary past
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(Öhman & Mineka, 2001). The fact that people are prepared to learn to fear specific types of
objects that posed harm in ancestral environments suggests that we are equipped with
specialized mechanisms.
To acknowledge domain-specificity is not to argue for a genetic determinist viewpoint.
Indeed, to be adaptive, the different systems involved in varying types of information must
be flexible and sensitive to environmental inputs. For example, the human language capacity
meets most criteria for a domain-specific cognitive system, yet it clearly requires flexibility.
To exercise the human capacity for language, people need to be exquisitely sensitive to
environmental inputs—to learn which sound sequences comprise the particular language
spoken in their local community (Pinker, 1994). Similarly, although responses to threats
(such as spiders, snakes, and snarling dogs) are processed according to rules specialized in
ways very different from those governing language acquisition, the fear system also involves
flexible (and in this case, very rapid) learning of which stimuli to associate with danger
(Öhman & Mineka, 2001).
The implication of the work on domain-specificity is that although it may make some sense
to try to equate different kinds of utility, the human brain does not equate them, and in fact
responds to different kinds of utility using different cognitive processing rules, and applies
those rules in flexible, but predictable, ways across different contexts. Thus, whereas the
idea that utility = fitness suggests that human decision-making is geared to maximize fitness
generally, the idea of deep rationality suggests human decision-making is geared
specifically to solve recurring adaptive problems in different domains, whereby successful
solutions to such problems are associated with increased fitness. The notion of deep
rationality builds on previous work showing that human decision biases can be better
understood by considering the ecological context for which such biases evolved (e.g.,
Gigerenzer, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006).
Life History, Sexual Selection, and Differential Parental Investment
Animals exhibit a variety of reproductive life histories. Some animals start reproducing
shortly after birth and produce thousands of offspring, whereas some wait decades and
produce only a handful; some animals devote no effort whatsoever to caring for their
progeny, whereas others sacrifice the bulk of their own bodily resources, and sometimes
their lives, to protecting and nurturing their young. Studying the array of unique adaptations
found across the animal kingdom has uncovered several general principles governing the
evolution of diverse traits, as well as some recurring linkages between those traits and
environmental constraints and opportunities. One powerful set of principles is embodied in
life history theory, which assumes all organisms must resolve a key set of trade-offs
throughout their lives (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005; Kenrick & Keefe, 1992). Central trade-
offs involve allocating energy to development versus mating versus parenting. For example,
effort spent on attracting mates is effort that cannot be spent on caring for young. Depending
on ecological factors, different animals allocate effort differently across their life-spans.
Some fish, for instance, change from small drab females into large colorful males if a
territory becomes available; some animals (such as salmon) reproduce in a single grand
effort, whereas others (such as elephants) reproduce repeatedly over their life-spans.
Within any given species, females and males often have different life histories. Part of the
reason has to do with differential parental investment, which refers to one sex contributing
relatively more to rearing offspring, discrepancies that in turn carry a number of important
consequences for mating choices and competition within a sex. When there is a difference in
the amount of parental investment, it is more commonly females who provide greater
amounts of offspring care. In mammals, for example, females carry the young inside their
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bodies and nurse them after they are born. Because mammalian females always pay a high
price for reproduction—whereas males may contribute little or nothing to offspring care—
females are relatively more selective in their choice of mates (Trivers, 1972).
Individual members of the sex investing less in offspring tend to compete with one another
for mating opportunities with the higher-investing sex. Thus, differential parental investment
is intrinsically linked to sexual selection, which refers to the relative evolutionary success of
traits that assist in mating (by helping either to attract the opposite sex or to compete against
members of one's own sex). Darwin developed the idea of sexual selection to address the
fact that some adaptations result in one sex being larger, more colorful, and more
competitive than the other. Sexual selection is the process by which peacocks developed
their bright feathers: although energetically expensive to produce and maintain, the displays
increase the males' chances of attracting peahens. Ostentatious feathers are found in
peacocks and not peahens because the females make a greater investment in the offspring,
and are therefore choosier about their mating partners (who must consequently compete to
be chosen).
Thus, the theories of sexual selection and differential parental investment are useful in
understanding sex differences, which are expected to change in predictable ways depending
on the stage of an individual's life-history. One key implication from life history theory is
that men and women will have intrinsically different utility functions for some categories of
benefits, and that what is deeply rational for a female is not always deeply rational for a
male. Another possible implication for humans is that, even within a sex, different people
will have different utility functions if they are enacting different mating strategies.
A Modular View of Utility
Our general argument thus far is that there may be important implications of domain-
specificity and life-history theory for “rational decision making.” The notion of deep
rationality suggests that different decision rules will apply to different kinds of cognitive
inputs. A complementary implication is that complex social situations will be processed very
differently depending on which fundamental motivational systems are currently active. If a
woman enters a room full of people, she will attend to, remember, and behave very
differently if she is concerned about threats to physical safety as compared to finding a
romantic partner (e.g., Griskevicius, Goldstein, et al., 2006; Kenrick, Delton, Robertson,
Becker, & Neuberg, 2007; N. Li, Halterman, Cason, Knight, & Maner, 2008; Maner et al.,
2005, Neuberg, Kenrick, Maner, & Schaller, 2004; Schaller et al., 2007). Still other
information will be salient, and decisions will be made differently, if she is motivated to find
a new friend or to advance her status (Ackerman et al., 2007; Maner, DeWall, Baumeister,
& Schaller, 2007). Finally, this approach implies a dynamic interaction between the
currently active motivational system and the other people present in the situation. Although
an attractive member of the opposite sex may be generally salient, for example, that same
attractive target may or may not elicit romantic motivation depending on whether he or she
appears to be alone versus is holding hands with someone.
Life-history theory also has implications for the investment of scarce resources, which
would be expected to vary in predictable ways with life stage (e.g., whether a person is
engaged primarily in searching for mates versus caring for offspring), ecological factors
(e.g., sex ratios, availability of mating opportunities, presence of competitors or relatives),
and individual differences (e.g., the person's sex and typical mating strategy). We have
argued elsewhere that different decision biases involved in human social interactions can be
usefully organized into several sets of recurrent challenges and opportunities (Ackerman &
Kenrick, 2008; Kenrick et al., 2003; Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2009). In Table 1, we
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consider the different domains of affiliation, status, self-protection, mate search, mate
retention, and kin care—domains which arguably encompass most of the decisions people
make in their everyday social lives. We suggest some systematic differences in the “utility”
and “disutility” associated with certain fitness-relevant outcomes, consistent with
evolutionary principles. For example, priming individuals with the domain of mate search
leads them to respond more aggressively to insults (Griskevicius, Tybur, et al., in press).
Although physically assaulting someone after an insult is rarely a rational response, the fact
that such responses are amplified when mating motives are active is consistent with the
deeper rationality underlying human mating (Wilson & Daly, 1985). Thus, although these
types of domain-specific biases are not necessarily reflected in conscious strategic planning,
they are nevertheless presumed to be “rational” in a deeper sense.
The biases given as examples in the rightmost column of Table 1 have been discussed in
detail elsewhere (e.g., Kenrick, Maner, & Li, 2006; Schaller, Park, & Kenrick, 2007). Those
decision biases are based on theoretical considerations, but have received some degree of
support from empirical research. Such research includes Griskevicius, Goldstein et al. (in
press) on conformity under fear motivation; Cosmides and Tooby (1992) on cheater
detection; Wilson and Daly (1985) on risky behavior by young unmated males; Becker,
Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, and Smith (2007) on rapid detection of anger in male faces;
Ackerman et al. (2006) on memory for angry outgroup faces; Griskevicius, Goldstein et al.
(2006),Griskevicius, Cialdini, and Kenrick (2006), and Griskevicius, Tybur et al. (2007) on
male counterconformity and display vs. female generosity under mating mating motivation,
and on female generosity under mating motivation; Dijkstra and Buunk (1998),Gutierres,
Kenrick, and Partch (1999), and Kenrick, Neuberg, Zierk, and Krones (1994) on attention to
socially dominant men and attractive women; and Laham, Gonsalkorale and von Hippel
(2005) on biases in grandparental investment.
When people are actively pursuing one of these social goals (self-protection versus kin care,
for example), the focus on that domain evokes processing attunements that lead to decisions
(e.g., taking a much longer route home) consistent with achieving that particular goal
(avoidance of dark areas at night), but that are not necessarily aligned with other goals
(spending more time at home with one's children). Such attunements, consisting of biases in
attention, information processing, and decision criteria (e.g., Haselton & Buss, 2000;
Griskevicius et al., in press; Maner et al., 2005), would have led to behaviors with positive
fitness consequences for most of human ancestral history.
In the remainder of this article, we consider several aspects of economic decision-making
studied by economists and economically oriented psychologists. As we do so, we indicate
some ways in which an evolutionary domain-specific approach suggests systematic
variations in how such decisions are made.
Diminishing Marginal Utility
Marginal utility refers to the expected benefit one might obtain from an increase in any
given good (the third slice of pizza as compared to the second, for example). For many
goods, there is a diminishing marginal utility: the expected benefit of getting 1 slice of pizza
as compared to none is greater than the expected benefit of getting 11 slices as compared to
10, for instance. If one plots a utility function for such a good, therefore, it is not linear, but
rather curves downward in typical logarithmic fashion. Figure 1 shows college students'
judgments of the marriage value of opposite-sex targets as a function of the targets' income
(based on Kenrick, Sundie, Nicastle, & Stone, 2001). Two things are important to note:
First, students perceived greater increases in value in going from potential mates with very
low incomes to middle levels of income than they did in going from potential mates with
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middle incomes to high incomes. Second, the curve is steeper for females judging males
than for males judging females; women care more about avoiding destitute partners than do
males. In contrast, when the same participants judged identical targets as short-term sexual
partners, women's judgments of men became less steep (similar to the male line in Figure 1),
and men's judgments yielded a poorly fitting and relatively flat function (indicating that
males judging women as sexual partners were largely oblivious to those women's income
levels).
When one considers the different contributions that men and women make to their offspring
under long- versus short-term mating arrangements, these judgments can be seen to reflect
rational biases. Women's contributions to their offspring have traditionally involved more
direct physiological resources (e.g., pregnancy and nursing), whereas men's contributions
have traditionally involved indirect resources (provision of food and shelter), which in
modern societies are signaled by one's ability to generate income. Thus, long-term mate
value is more likely to increase as a function of income for women judging male partners
than for men judging female partners; hence, the curve is steeper for women. In the ancestral
past, it is likely that offspring survival depended on having access to a critical minimum
level of resources. Though more is better, further amounts beyond the required mimimum
likely contributed increasingly less to survival prospects. Thus, the curves flatten as income
increases, reflecting diminishing marginal utility of income. In support of this, the value of
status has been found to marginally diminish in economics-based research investigating
women's preferences for long-term mates (N. Li, Kenrick, Bailey, & Linsenmeier, 2002).
For short-term sexual partners, women may be less certain of obtaining a portion of a man's
resources, and thus seem to place greater emphasis on male features correlated with “good
genes” (e.g., symmetry, attractiveness, physical size) (Gangestad, Garver-Apgar, Simpson,
& Cousins, 2007; Little, Jones, & DeBruine, 2008). On the other hand, because men stand to
make very little investment of indirect resources to offspring from short-term mates, they
become relatively nondiscriminating (e.g., Gangestad & Simpson, 2000; Kenrick, Sadalla,
Groth, & Trost, 1990; Li & Kenrick, 2006). Such considerations are reflected by the flatter
female curve and non-fitting male curve when considering potential short-term mates.
As in the case of men and women judging mates and seeking status, we would guess that
marginal utility curves will vary depending on a number of factors linked to fundamental
motivations and life-history strategy. For example, one might expect that activating the
motivation to seek new mates would lead the utility curve for one's own increments in status
to flatten at a higher level for men, but not for women (cf. Griskevicius, Cialdini, & Kenrick,
2006; Roney, 2003).
Risk Aversion versus Risk Seeking
Most decisions about where to invest one's time and effort involve some degree of
uncertainty. For example, although a person will generally get higher payoffs from a risky
retirement portfolio, the stock market may crash dramatically. Similarly, the time spent
writing a grant proposal or submitting an article to a top journal may not pay off, and the
energy invested in getting to know a new romantic partner may not result in a satisfactory
long-term relationship. In ancestral environments, people often operated close to the margin,
with a serious danger that they, or their children, might not survive if they misjudged how to
invest their time and effort.
Evidence from modern groups living in hunter-gatherer or horticultural societies suggests
that human beings are generally risk-averse, preferring to invest in activities with relatively
low risks as opposed to those with potentially higher, but riskier, outcomes (Winterhalder,
2007). Such “risk aversion” is consistent with a standard observation in market economics
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called “loss aversion.” This phenomenon refers to people's stronger preference of avoiding
losses than acquiring comparable gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Findings on both risk
aversion and loss aversion suggest that people, whether in traditional societies or in modern
market economies, are cognitively biased to ensure that they do not fall below some minimal
threshold of resources necessary for survival (e.g., Wang, 2002).
Figure 2 depicts the psychological differences between gains and losses, as outlined in
Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory (Kahenman & Tversky, 1979, pp. 279). The X-
axis depicts the objective gains (moving from the center zero point to the right) and
objective losses (moving from the center zero point to the left). The Y-axis depicts changes
in psychological utility (or the changes in expected value or happiness with movements
away from the zero point). The solid line depicts the focal difference between losses and
gains. For example, an objective loss of $200 is expected to produce more psychological
change than an objective gain of similar magnitude.
We would expect this function to vary in line with evolutionarily relevant factors. The
lighter line in the figure depicts a hypothesized sex difference in decision-making that
follows from our earlier discussion. Given findings that mating motivation leads men to
display resources and status (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2007), we might expect men with
activated mating motives to be more willing to take financial risks to achieve gains. This
risk-taking would serve two main purposes—to impress desirable potential mates and to
possibly obtain more resources than would be possible by taking the safer route. Thus, for
men in a mating mind-set, winning $200 may be as satisfying, if not more so, than losing
$200 is disappointing (see Figure 2). Women, on the other hand, might not respond the same
way to a mating prime, knowing (at least implicitly) that men do not place as much
emphasis on women's money and resources when considering them as potential mates
(Kenrick et al., 2001). Indeed, women might actually become more risk-averse or loss-
averse when in a mating state because females traditionally have more to lose by careless
mating choices (e.g., Haselton & Buss, 2000; Griskevicius, Goldstein, et al., 2006). That is,
women might be less risk-seeking with respect to losses, risk-averse with respect to gains,
and loss averse in general when in a mating state.
Of course, gains and losses often involve goods that are not typically traded for money, such
as friends or attractiveness to the opposite sex. In an ongoing series of studies, we have been
asking people to imagine that they could exchange any or all of a windfall $1000 for social
benefits (e.g., in increase in attractiveness to the opposite sex, new friends, or a gain in
status) or to avoid social losses (e.g., a decrease in attractiveness, or loss of friends or
status). Preliminary results reveal the typical loss aversion, such that people pay more to
avoid a given amount of loss in friendship networks, for example, than they pay for a
comparable gain. However, this general loss-aversion bias is not very strong for all social
categories, and even reverses itself for males who have been exposed to a short-term mating
context (Y. Li, Griskevicius, & Kenrick, 2008). These are preliminary findings, but an
evolutionary perspective leads to the general expectation that relative valuations of gains
and losses will vary in important ways as a function of domain-specific evaluations and life-
history considerations.
Temporal versus Probability Discounting
Due to their risk aversion, people tend to devalue benefits that are not certain and
immediately available. From an evolutionary perspective this makes sense because promised
future benefits may never materialize, and because waiting for resources in the future may
often result in lost reproductive opportunities (Wilson & Daly, 2004). These important
considerations are consistent with the concept of discounting found in economics.
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Discounting can be separated into two potentially distinct components: temporal discounting
(the decreasing valuation of rewards the longer one must wait to receive them) and
probability discounting (the decreasing valuation of rewards the less certain one is to receive
them) (Green & Myerson, 2004). In other words, a given benefit (e.g., $1000) is worth less
if you have to wait for it (temporal discounting) and if there is some uncertainty regarding
whether or not you will get it (probability discounting).
The classic example of temporal (or future) discounting involves a choice between a larger
and a smaller reward, where the smaller reward is available sooner than the larger one.
Although an individual may choose the larger, later reward when both alternatives are well
in the future, with the passage of time the preference may reverse so that the individual now
chooses the smaller, sooner reward. For example, one might prefer to receive $100 right
now rather than $120 one month from now (even though the additional $20 in one month
would have been equivalent to a 240 percent annualized interest rate on the $100). A good
example of this phenomenon is found among people who win public lotteries. Winners
frequently sell their income stream to companies that pay them cash at a huge discount rate
—one that greatly exceeds the relatively risk-free rate that underlies the safe government
income stream.
It is generally presumed that any given individual has a stable discounting rate. For example,
a drug addict is believed to value the present more than a graduate student, who is much
more willing to defer gratification, meaning that he discounts the future at a less steep rate.
But in at least one experiment, researchers have shown that discount rates within individuals
actually vary in ways that reflect sensitivity to evolutionarily relevant stimuli. Wilson and
Daly (2004) had participants view attractive members of the opposite sex to activate
participants' mating motives, and then had them choose between immediate and delayed
rewards (for example, $25 today versus $60 in 6 months). Men who viewed attractive
women tended to shift their preferences toward immediate over delayed rewards (but
women who viewed attractive men did not). Wilson and Daly (2004) explained these
findings in terms of sex differences in mating strategies. Whereas males stand more chance
of improving their fitness from short-term expenditures of mating effort, females are, in line
with our earlier discussion of parental investment, more likely to focus on long-term
investments. Various forms of archival data are consistent with their analysis, with young
men being generally more focused on immediate rewards and more likely to engage in risky
behaviors with high immediate payoffs (e.g., Arias, 2002; Kirby & Marakovic, 1996). This
general tendency for young males to take more risk than young females can have long-term
economic consequences. Young single men are generally more likely to adopt riskier
investment strategies in their retirement packages than are women, and as a result, at
retirement time those men tend to have earned, on average, substantially higher yields on
their investments (Sundén & Surette, 1998).
From an evolutionary perspective, temporal and probability discounting may be designed to
manage qualitatively distinct types of risk. If so, activating different fundamental motives
may influence each type of discount rate in different ways. For instance, activating mating
or status concerns should lead men to become less risk-seeking regarding the future
(temporal discounting). That is, as mentioned above for mating motives, status motives
should also lead men to prefer taking less money now rather than risk their chances to wait
for more money in the future (Wilson & Daly, 2004). But activating the same status or
mating motives should lead men to become more risk-seeking regarding probabilistic
rewards, meaning that men should be more willing to take risks with their money for
potential immediate payoffs.
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Indifference Curves and Spending Budgets: Optimizing Combinations of
Benefits
One aspect of rational decision-making involves allocating one's limited resources to
optimal combinations of goods. Indifference curves are a microeconomic concept indicating
levels of overall utility that a consumer derives from bundles of goods (brownies and
mochas, for example). They are useful for expressing the trade-offs people make between
those goods. Each point on an indifference curve consists of a different combination of
goods that provides an identical level of overall utility, given the available budget (Eatwell,
Newgate, & Newman, 1987).
Indifference curves and budget constraints can be employed to capture some of the
qualitiative shifts in “consumption” that would accompany changes in preferences due to
activated motives, or individual differences linked to life-history strategies. For example, a
person may place similar value on time spent with a new romantic partner (call that good X)
and time spent at work (good Y). As such, one's indifference curves for those two activities
may look like Figure 3a. However, after seeing a workmate get promoted, status motives
may become activated, causing a shift in one's preferences such that one now devalues
romance relative to work; appearing more like Figure 3d. More generally, from the
evolutionary perspective of deep rationality, indifference curves will be influenced in
reliable ways depending on the social domain that is currently most pressing, in combination
with life-history characteristics of the decision-makers. We would expect that the shape of
these curves, and their variations across situations, can give important clues about the
operation of underlying adaptive psychological mechanisms.
Another way in which to incorporate evolutionary thinking about regularities in people's
preferences is to consider what kinds of goods will constitute “necessities” versus
“luxuries.” When people have nothing and are given a low income, they typically allocate a
relatively high proportion of the income toward what is most essential for basic living –
necessities. However, necessities face diminishing marginal utility, so that if additional
income becomes available, it tends to be spent not on additional necessities (e.g., more low
quality foods, more electricity), but rather, on luxuries (e.g., fine dining, private education,
vacations). Figure 4b plots necessities versus luxuries as goods. At low levels of overall
utility, indifference curves are steep towards the more valuable necessities (U1). However, at
higher levels of overall utility, indifference curves shift to being steep towards luxuries (U3).
These microeconomic concepts have been used to examine how social psychological
choices vary with evolutionarily relevant factors. For instance, Li and colleagues (2002)
gave men and women low, medium, and high budgets of “mate dollars” to purchase levels
of characteristics pertaining to a potential long-term mate. When budgets were low, men
tended to purchase physical attractiveness, whereas women tended to purchase social status
and resources. As budgets grew, people spent less on these sex-differentiated characteristics
and spent a greater proportion on other characteristics, including creativity.
These findings were consistent with an economically informed evolutionary view of mate
choice. Given that ancestral women varied in their ability to bear children, and that features
judged in females are related to fertility (e.g., Singh, 1993), it makes sense for males to
prioritize obtaining a minimal level of physical attractiveness to increase the odds that a
mate is fertile. Similarly, ancestral men varied in their ability to provide essential resources
for offspring. In particular, those men with little or no social status may have had little or no
access to resources. Thus, it made sense for ancestral females to prioritize obtaining a
minimal level of social status to ensure that their mates could provide at least some
resources for potential offspring.
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However, as a potential mate demonstrates more than minimal levels of these
characteristics, they likely decrease in marginal utility; further gains along these dimensions
will increase a mate's reproductive value increasingly less. Thus, when given additional
mating income (the ability to afford a mate of higher overall quality), other characteristics
become more highly valued. In other words, both sexes would ideally like to have a well-
rounded, high-quality mate, if they had a high budget (i.e., if they were themselves a very
desirable mate). However, if a person's choices are highly constrained (as they are for most
mortals), men prioritize physical attractiveness and women prioritize social status as
necessities. Thus, an economic view helps address a debate about whether the sexes are
different or similar when it comes to mate preferences (Li & Kenrick, 2006). As shown in
Figure 5, sex differences in mate preferences are relatively large when choices are
constrained by a low mating budget (with men favoring physical attractiveness and women
favoring resources), but as mating budgets expand and choices are less constrained, sex
differences tend to disappear.
The notion of budget constraints is highly useful when examining not just mate preferences,
but when investigating any kind of decision-making. After all, individuals not only have
different “budgets” of financial resources but they also have different budgets of time and
energy that can be spent on different activities. Thus, although a young executive may desire
to outshine her peers and become a corporation vice-president in record time, while also
cooking healthy dinners for her family every night after picking up her kids from school,
time and energy constraints make it unlikely that she will be able to accomplish all these
competing goals. Instead, her allocation of time and energy will depend on which particular
motives are currently active in combination with life-history considerations. For example,
children are well-designed with behaviors that trigger parental care motivations, such that a
crying child is likely to redirect any resources away from career concerns. Women with
children are acutely sensitive to the specific cries of their own children (Soltis, 2005). This
re-allocation of effort might be expected to occur for both parents, but somewhat more
readily for females, and any such sex difference ought to be magnified by any factors that
reduce paternal certainty (Laham et al., 2005). On the other hand, an active mate acquisition
goal would be expected, in line with our earlier discussion, to influence men's allocation of
effort to status more than women's.
Conclusion
Are human beings rational decision-makers in the classic economic sense? On the one hand,
the considerations we have raised support a view of people as ultimately quite rational. On
the other hand, these considerations also suggest important additions to the traditional
economic approach to rationality. For one thing, there are predictable variations linked to
adaptive goals and life history that have critically important influences on how people
allocate their limited resources, and ignoring those variations leaves us with an incomplete
accounting of rational decision-making. For another, the emphasis on goods traded on
financial markets may be fine for economists concerned only with aggregate decision-
making on such markets, but people's everyday decisions about resource allocation involve
non-monetary goods and services; instead they involve other people who are not subjected
to the same rules that apply between stockbrokers in different trading houses on Wall Street
(Clark, Mills, & Powell, 1986; Fiske 1992; Kenrick, Sundie, & Kurzban, 2008).
Furthermore, particular aggregations of individuals under particular evolutionarily relevant
circumstances will make very different choices than other aggregations of individuals under
other evolutionarily relevant circumstances. Understanding such differences could allow for
more fine-tuned understanding of decision-making than the assumption that individual
differences are arbitrary.
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Economic psychologists have generated a host of findings that challenge assumptions of
classical economic models, inspired by demonstrations such as Kahneman and Tversky's
(1979) findings that slight variations in decision frame can lead to very different evaluations
of mathematically identical problems. But diverse demonstrations of immediately
suboptimal decisions leaves unanswered the deeper question is what exactly makes for a
“rational” decision (c.f. Funder, 1987; Haselton & Buss, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006;
Krueger & Funder, 2004). The classical view of rationality as the maximization of expected
satisfaction cannot explain the way that most people make most of their decisions—and may
not even explain the typical economist's decisions in important everyday contexts. Viewed
from an evolutionary perspective, people generally make decisions according to a set of
underlying decision-rules that, on average, would have resulted in fitness benefits in typical
ancestral human groups. In this sense, human decision making exhibits deep rationality.
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Figure 1.
Marginal utility of income in a mate varies with sex of the decision-maker.
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Figure 2.
Relative valuation of gains and losses. The dark line shows the typical function in which a
given sized loss has more disutility than a comparable gain has utility. The lighter line is a
hypothesized case in which these valuations might reverse (for men under mating
motivation).
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Figure 3.
Indifference curves of various types.
Note: The line U1, U2, and U3 desribe three increasingly desirable (and increasingly
expensive) utility functions (utility level U3 > U2 > U1). For example, imagine that Good Y
refers to brownies and Good X. Figure 3a depicts the state of affairs when a person prefers a
combination of goods, as when increasing numbers of brownies without additional mochas
would bring very little additional expected satisfaction (hence the convex shape in the
curve). If x and y are perfect complements (e.g., left and right shoes), an increment in one
without an increment in the other brings no increased utility (as in Figure 3b). If they are
perfect substitutes (a mocha from one neighborhood Starbucks vs. another, for example),
then the lines would not curve (as in figure 3c). If the person only values one but not the
other (loves brownies, but hates all coffee drinks, for example), then the line would runs
parallel and flat with respect to the devalued commodity (as in Figure 3d).
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Figure 4.
Indifference curves and budgets.
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Figure 5.
Sex differences in proportion spent on physical attractiveness, status/resources, and other
characteristics as a function of budget. Positive numbers denote females spending relatively
more than males. Thus, on a low budget, women spent much more than men on resources
and much less on attractiveness. This sex difference was reduced at high budgets.
Reproduced from Li et al. (2002).
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Table 1
Examples of behaviors and decisions associated with more or less utility in six broad social domains, and
some decision biases associated with each domain.
Social domain and
associated social
goal
Outcomes yielding relative
utility
Outcomes yielding relative disutility Typical decision biases
Affiliation
Form and maintain
cooperative
alliances
Proximity to alliance partners
Sharing resources equally
among alliance partners
Social exclusion
Reciprocity violations
Propensity to affiliate and conform when
feeling fearful
Sensitive cheating detection for
reciprocity violations.
Status
Gain and maintain
social status
Dominating competitors
(relatively more for men)
Basking in reflective glory of
group members' achievements
Deference to more powerful others
Public losses of relative status
Risky status-yielding activities more
attractive for young unmated men and
less attractive for women.
Self-Protection
Protect oneself and
valued others from
threats
Higher ratio of ingroup to
outgroup members when threats
salient.
Barriers to outgroup members
(e.g., walls, locks)
Being in a numerical minority when
threat salient
Presence of threatening outgroup
members who are male and/or large.
Rapid detection of anger in male (versus
female) faces
Enhanced memory of angry outgroup
male faces.
Mate Search
Attract desirable
mates
For males judging females:
Cues to youth, health and
fertility
For females judging males:
Cues to investment as long-
term mates, social dominance
and physical symmetry in short-
term mates.
Poor health, aging cues, assymmetry.
Conformity and deference to other
males among potential male mates.
Males take more risks and resist
conformity when mating opportunities
are salient.
Females are more publicly (but not
privately) generous under mating
motivation.
Mate Retention
Retain and foster
long-term mating
bonds
Communal sharing with
relationship partner, rather than
equality-based sharing
Investment in partner's
offspring
Cues to emotional infidelity
(relatively more salient to females
judging males)
Cues to sexual infidelity (relatively
more salient to males judging females
Attention by women to other physically
attractive women.
Attention by men to other socially
dominant men
Kin Care
Invest in offspring
and genetic relatives
Benefits to offspring, and to
other relatives (discounted by
degree of relatedness)
Threats to kin versus non-genetically
related alliance partners
Perceived favoritism of one's parent
towards one's siblings
Grandparental investment highest by
grandmother in daughter's offspring
(tracking paternity certainty).
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